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Total Inventories during Business Cycles
This chapter and the next two are devoted to the cyclical behavior
of manufacturers' inventories in the aggregate. The data are de-
rived from accounting records and are dollar values. In the case
of one important block of data, current (book) valuesare cor-
rected for the influence of changes in prices to yield indexes of
physical volume. This chapter deals first with inventories incur-
rent prices, then with their volume as indicated by values in con-
stant prices.
1Inventories in Current Prices
The materials used in this chapter are described fully in Appendix
A. Brief notes will suffice here.
THE DATA
Kuzuet? estimates
Kumcts' estimates show the book value of inventories heldon De-
cembcr3i of each year I9I84I.1 For 1926-41 thebasic flguresare
drawn from the balance sheets filed with the United States Tress-
Ut)' Department by manufacturing corporations and published in
Stalislics of Income. A small adjustment sufficed to allow forcor-
porations that did not file balance sheets and somewhat larger ad-
justments for inventories held by unincorporated firms. FromI 918
to 1925 the estimates are derived by applying inventory-sales ratios
for samples of corporations in each manufacturinggroup to the
'Kuznet,' estimates for 1918.33 were published in Commodity Flow and
Capital Formation, Part VII. He generously put his figures for1934.38 at
my disposal In making estimates for later years, I used the same sources and
methods.78
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gross income of all cot porationsfrom Statistics ofIncome.'Adjust- ments werethen madefor unincorporatedfinns. WhileKuznets' estimates constitute themost useful and extensivebody ofdollar value materials, otherdata supplement,extend and,to a certain extent, check them.
Dun and Bradstreetwartime estinales
Dun and Bradstreetcompiled theaccounts of toG largemanufac.. turing corporationsthat publishyear end balance sheetsi3-22, constituting20-25 percent of allmanufacturingactivity. Tocon- struct a general indexfor manufacturingas a whole, datafor in- dividual companieswere aggregated to yieldindexes ofinventories in5 industry groups. Theindustry indexeswere then combined in both weightedand unweightedaverages.4 Thetwo types of average yield indexesfor all manufacturingthat areremarkably similar; inno year does thedifference exceed2 percent.
The Schmidt-Youngestimates
In connectionwith theirstudies inbusiness financingC. H. Schmidt and R.A. Younggathered reportsof 8i largemanufac- turingcorporations,1914-22, holdingabout i 8percent of total manufacturinginventories.5 Theindustrialcoverage is notcom- prehensive.
Terborgh's estimates
George Terborghprepared compositeindexes for 8durable andii nondurable goodsindustries foreach year end,1915-23, weighted 2 The levelof the datawas corrected bycomputinginventory-sates ratios
from sampledata for 1926and using thesample ratiosfor 1926 andearlier
years as an indexto extendinventory-grossincome ratiosfor 1926 from Statistics of Incometo earlieryears. Minor
adjustments sufficedto bring the
level of theestimates intoline with datafrom capitalstock taxreturns for
1923 and1924.
3 Dun'sReview Feb.1940. A fewconcerns engagedin miningare included.
In manufacturingapparentlyno leather tanningfinns are includedand the
sample seemsespecially weakin lumberand textiles. The weightswere basedon the 1937Census inventory
figures adjusted (or
differences in therates of growthof the various
industries sincethe period
to which theindex applies. 'The Effectof Waron BusinessFinancing:Manufacturing andTrade,
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largely by Kuanets' estimates of inventory holdings by industry in
i923.'Stocks held by unincorporated firms are allowed for. The
estimates of total inventories and of inventories in the durable and
nondurable goods groups are expressed both as indexes on a 1915
base and in dollars.
The sample on which the estimate is based for each year, 1916-
23 "coversnearly all of the manufacturing concerns for which
both the opening and closing inventories are reported in Moody's
Manuals."1 The sample companies are estimated to have held
about 25 percent of total manufacturing inventories in igi6 and
about 40 percent in 1923.
Curne's estimates
Lauchlin Currie compiled balance sheet information for a still
larger sample of manufacturers for year ends, I922-28. In 1928
they held more than 35 percent of total manufacturers' inventories.
Mr. Currie's comment upon his results is significant:
"Although care was taken to include the available reports of all
the smaller companies and also of companies in depressed industries,
the series as a whole is mainly representative of the larger and more
successful companies, owing to the greater availability of their finan-
cial statements."
The Dun and Bradstreet, Schmidt-Young, Terborgh, and Cur-
ne estimates all serve to check Kuznets' figures for the years before
igi6 when the latter are based on small samples of corporations.
Kuznets' estimates before1926arc based on corporation samples
that differ in size and composition from those used by the other
four estimators, which also differ among themselves. But the latter
estimated inventories directly while Kuznets estimated total stocks
by constructing indexes of inventory-sales ratios in ten industry
groups. From these indexes he extrapolated the inventory-sales
ratios for all corporations in these groups in 1926 and applied the
resulting ratios to comprehensive sales figures for all corporations.
'Manufacturing Inventories During and After the World War, Federal Re-
"TV' Bulletin, July 1941, PP.613-7.
Tlbid.,p. 613.
S The Decline of the Commercial Loan, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Aug. p. 6gg.National IndustrialConference Boardindexes
The NationalIndustrial ConferenceBoard presents
estimates b months sinceJanuary 1929 fora sample of largeand small6n Coveragewas small in the earlieryears of the period,but by1940 about one-sixthof all manufacturingactivitywas represented.The index isso constructed thatthe growth ofthe sampledoesnot affect the trendof the data.Companiesmanufacturingfood prod- ucts, tobacco,liquors, petroleum,and certainlumberproductsare not included"because theseindustriesare so closely tiedup with agricultureor with theextractive industries"and "donot repre. sent themore active sectorof industryin whichthe individualde- cisions ofindustrialmanagement havegreatest effecton business activity".9
DeparimentofCommerceindexes
A farmore extensivesample reportingby monthshas beenorgan- ized by theDepartment ofCommerce, givingfigures sinceDecent. ber 1938.'°The reportingfirmsnow numbermore than1,200, representingnearly 40percent of totalmanufacturing.Neverthe- lent, insome industriesthe sampleis still quite
inadequate (e.g., only i6apparelmanufacturerswere reportingin June1940). Moreover, thesample ofcompanies havingtotal assetsof lethan $500,000was purposelykept smallin orderto lightenthe task of handling thelarge numberof reportsrequired tocover this group properly. TheDepartment ofConunercenotes, however,that




Chart3 shows theseseven seriesplotted ina fashion thatdistin- Economic Record,Il, Supplement,Dec. 26,1940: Inventories,Shipments
and Orders,
1929.1940, p.L 10 Monthly











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































guishes their behavior during expansiOnS andcontractiOns of busi-
ness at large, marked off according to the NationalBureau stand-
ard monthly chronology. Thevigorous expansion accompanying
the boom of World War I and itsaftermath, the liquidationof
1920-21, and the subsequent recovery allappear clearly in thein-
ventory records. Equally markedare the big slump afterl92g,th
i933-37recovery, and the succeeding depressionandrecovery merging into the intense activityof World War II.
A somewhatmore systematic impression of theconformity of total holdingsto business cycles can be gainedfrom the chart.If we ignore the fact that theseries (except the NICBand Depart- ment of Commerce data)show the standing ofstocks onlyonce a year, and if we treat thelines drawn fromone December31 to the next as thoughthey represel3tedcontinuous series,several in- teresting observationscan be made. First, stocksare higher at every peak of generalbusiness thanat the precedingtrough.11 Further, they declineduring3of the 6 contractionscovered (1920- 21, 1926-27, and1929-33). In stillanother contraction,May 1937 to May 1938, theydecline ifwe take the evidenceof the NICB monthly seriesalthough in Kuznets'annual data theyrise. More- over, in all3 contractions in whichthe annualdata rise (1918-19, 1923-24,and1937-38)the rate is lowerthan in theprecedingcx- pansions. Thesuggestion ofpositive conformitywithmovements of generalbusiness, therefore,is strong.
The graphssuggest also thatstocks lag behindchanges ingen- eral business.During theperiod generalbusiness had7 troughs and 6 peaksisturns in all. Aturning pointin stocks isfound in the vicinityof 6 troughsandpeaks, sincethe Septemberigi8- April '919contraction doesnot appear inthe annualdata on which we haveto depend. Ofthe iiturns at whichwe can make comparisons,'2stocks apparentlyturn later thangeneral business 7 times. On 2occasions,December1914 and1927, they reach their troughat the end ofthe samemonthas generalbusiness does. i1Terborgh'sseries, however,appears to fallbetween thetrough in Sep-
tember192and the peakin Maysg, althoughKuznets' seriesrises.
12
Currie's sampleskips the1923-24Contraction,apparently becauseit rep-
resents theinventories oflarge corporationsonly. It thushas a pronounced
upward trendin thisperiod whichdoes notaffect aUmanufacturingbusiness
to the samedegree.TOTAL INVENTORIES DURING BUSINESS CYCLES 83
The evidence at the other 2 turns is mixed. At the trough in
March i933 Kuznets' annual series appears to lead, but the NICB
monthly series lags. The 2 series arc sufficiently similar in their
movements to suggest that the lag in the latter would appcar also
in Kuznets' series were it available by months. At the business cycle
peak of October 1926, however, the evidence suggests that stocks
turned before business at large. Kuznets' series reaches a peak on
December 31, 1925, the year end preceding the business cycle
peak. Currie's series reaches a peak on December 31,1926,the
year end following the monthly peak in business. The apparent
lag of Curric's series may, however, reflect only its upward trend,
a feature consistent with the fact that his sample is supposed to
represent fully only large corporations.
Inspection of a chart is suggestive, but the need for more sys-
tematic measurement of the relation between stocks and business
cycles is obvious. For this purpose we use the measures of con-
forrnity and timing described in Chapter 3.18 For both we adapt
National Bureau methods to the peculiarities of year end series and
apply them to Kuznets' estimates for total manufacturing and for
his ten component industry groups.
Table 20 presents the timing measures. It tells whether stocks
tend to lead or lag at the turns of general business as determined
by the National Bureau monthly chronology. The table was pre-
pared by calculating the number of months by which the Decem-
ber 31 turns of stocks preceded or followed the monthly reference
dates. The average lead or lag is the simple mean of the individual
comparisons. All inventory series were treated positively, that is,
peaks in stocks were compared with corresponding peaks in busi-
ness, and troughs in stocks withcorresponding troughs in business.
These systematic timing comparisons reveal a pronounced tend-
ency for inventories in book values tolag behind general business.
The series representing the aggregate holdings of manufacturers
lags in 8 comparisons out of io. Of the 77 comparisons thatcould
s Conformity measures were not computed for the shorter annual series or
for the monthly NICB data depicted in Chart.None was long enough to
snake such measures meaningful. As far a.s they go, however,their behavior
is fully contistent with the calculations made from Kuznets'series, which
are longer.84













(5) Total manufacturing 2 8 +3.8 Food, beverage,& tobacco 2 4 +3.7 Textiles & textileproducts 5 3 2.2
inc
Leather & leatherproducts 3(2)'+4.0 +4.4 Rubber & relatedproducts 7(2)'+5.4 +6.g Bur
Lumber & woodproducts z 3 + 3.8
year
Paper, printing& publishing 3 7 + 5.0 Chemicals & alliedproducts i g +5.0 olo
Stone, clay & glassproducts'08(a)' + 12.1 + 11.2
sen
Metals & metalproducts 2 6 +6.i Miscellaneous t 8 +6.z
reac SumOflogroupi 19 8(6)'
we
busi
Av. of iogroups weighted byno. of turns +5.0 +5.2 'Figures inparentheses arcthe number ofadditional comparisonssue,ttd year
by markedacceleration ordeceleration of trend.
We
Includes turnssuggested by amarked changein trend. 'Averages includea peak fl 1930and a trough in1922. The standing ofthe sulti
series, however,was the same in1929 as lB 1930and virtuallythe same
then
1921 as in 1922.




Concerning thelength of thelag,one must speakmore warily.
assut
Timingcomparisonsmade fromannual datacannot be veryac-
are
curate, and it isbetter to thinkin terms ofa range than ofa single
thou
figure. Ontheaverage, theaggregate holdingsof manufactureis
only
14That is, thepoint of
pronounced reductionin an upwardtrend (or a-
celeration ofa downwardtrend) iscounted asa peak; the point ofp'- siolis
nounced accelerationof an upwardtrend (orreduction ofa downward
As




Timing at BusinessCycle Turns,1918.1938
AV. La/iD ()01
LAO (+),uo.
Actual & Actualindicated Leads Lags turns turns'WrAL INVENTORIES DURING BUSINESS CYCLES 85
appeared to lag 3.8 months behind the turns of general business.
Bight of the ten industry groups yielded average lags ofto 6. i
There was one longer lag and one shorter lead. If we
hjnk of inventories in current prices as tending to lag 3-6 months
j,ehind business in general, we shall probably not be far wrong.
This conclusion should be applied to manufacturers' inventories
s awhole, not to individual industries or commodities. In Chap-
I argued that timing measures made from annual data are
unlikely to be rehable unless the series is very long. Our own series
e shorter thanthe standard there laid down. I use them because
I can bring to bear the evidence not of one but of ten indicators of
manufacturers' stocks. It is important, however, to use the results
to get a general impression about manufacturers' holdings inthe
aggregate and not to seek more detailed results for members of the
group.
To say that stocks tend to lag 3-6 months at reference turns im-
plies a certain regularity in their behavior. This can be tested by
measures of conformity. For this purpose we adapt the National
Bureau standard measure to the peculiarities of annual single-date,
year end series. The readerwill recall that to establish a chron-
ology of business expansions and contractions for synchronous
series we determined the December 31'S when business successively
reached peak and trough levels. If a series tends to lag 3 months
we predate our year end stocks 3 months and use aSeptember 30
business chronology. If a series tends to lag 6 months, we predate
year end stocks 6 months and use a June 30chronology, and so on.
We choose the timing category in which a series belongs by con-
sulting our regular timing comparisons (in this case Table 20),
then round the average lead or lag to the nearest 3-month interval.
We measure conformity on other than a synchronous basis only if
average timing is based on at least sevencomparisons and we never
aseume a lead or lag longer than 12 months.Seven comparisons
are hardly enough to give reliable resultsfor individual series, al-
though this is a fairly strict standard for series that extend through
only five business cycles. Once again, therefore, we apply our find-
ings only to manufacturers' stocks as a whole and avoidconclu-
sions about individual series.
As to the meaning of the indexes, it is only necessary to remem-86
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ber that in order to score +100 in conformity toexpansion, a serj
must stand higher at the end than at the beginning ofevery busj-
neexpansion. A score of +50 means that the seriesrose in three
out of four expansions; ±33 means it didso in two out of tbre
(or four out of six) times, andso on. Conformity tocontractjo
is measured in the sameway, except that ±Ioo means thatthe
series dcclines in every contraction. Thereis one complicationA
series with a rising trend is likelyto have a high score inexpansio
and a low score in contractions. Henceour measure of confomij
to full cycles is based on a comparison of therates of growth dur-
ing both contraction and expansion.Thus a seriescan score +100
in conformity to full cycles if iteither rises in every businessexpan-
sion and falls in every contractionor if it simply rises more rapidly
in each expansion than inadjacent contractions. Ofcourse if a
series tends to decline inexpansions and rise incontractions our
indexes will have negative signs,and if a series doesso invariably
it will score too. Our resultsfor inventories incurrent prices are
summarized in Table21.
The lesson to which thetable as a whole pointsis clear. Allow-
21
Manufacturers' Inventories,Current Prices




ASSUMFi,'NO. OF INDEit OF rnNFMflY TO UMNF53 (Mo.) pnAsLsb Exp. Contr. Cycle (') (e) (s)() (a) (6) Total manufacturing +3 10+100+100+100 Food, beverages & tobacco o' 10 +6o2o +56 Textiles & textile products
3 10 +20 +33 Leather & leather products+3 10 + 20 +6o+6 Rubber & related products+6 +6o +67 +60 Lumber & wood products oc so +20 -33 Paper, printing &publishing+6 +20 o+o Chemicals & allied products+6 + 100 +67 + 100 Stone, clay&glauproducts+12 ii+OO +33 +100 Metals & metalproducts +6 +6o +33 +8o Misceflanus +6 so +6o +fio +78 'From Table 20, col.and 5. Resultsare rounded to thenearest 3-month interval.
bThat is, expansionsplus CofltraCtionsThe ntnnber ofphases varies slightly from series to seriesbecause the businesschronology of certain timingcate- gorie, brings an extra phasewithin the periodcovered by our series. Inventories are matchedsynchronously withbusiness cycles because timing comparisons were too fewto furnish a soundbasis for any otherprocedure.r.yri.. INVENTORIES DURING BUSINESS CYCLES 87
ing for timingdifferences, the degree of conformity is highstrik-
ingly so for annual data. Seven of the ten industry groups yield
conformity indexes for full cycles that are higher than 50; all ex-
cept one are positive.The indexes for total manufacturing indicate
p.fect conformity to expansions and contractions as well. Manu-
facturCiS' aggregate holdings rose in each of five expansions, fell
in each of five contractions. Even the one defection from positive
behavior, lumber, is a doubtful case. Conformity was measured on
a synchronousbasis because only four comparisons were available
to establish a typical lead or lag. If we relax our rule and allow
for a 3-month lag as suggested by the average timing of this series,
its conformity indexes would run -1-6o, +20, + 100.
The expansion and contraction indexes point a lesson of their
own. True,manuf acturers' aggregate holdings conformed perfectly
to individual phases, but the expansion indexes of the individual
groups run somewhat lower than the full cycle indexes, and the
contraction indexes are much lower, sometimes negative. Conse-
quently, a considerable portion of the regular positive conformity
evidenced by the full cycle measures must reflect the impact of
business cycles on the trend of the growth of stocks rather than on
the direction of their movement. Stocks often do not fall in con-
tractions, but they almost always grow more slowly. This qualifi-
cation, however, is probably less serious than our measures indi-
cate. An annual series with a rising trend will skip more contrac-
tions than will a monthly series. We can be fairly sure that if we
had monthly data, both the expansion and the contraction indexes
would be higher. Subject to these qualifications, one can say: in-
ventories in current prices tend to conform positively to business
cycles if we allow for a 3-6 month lag. Judged by the interwar rec-
ord, this is a regular feature of business cycles.
All thesc lessons can be confirmed and more learned by close
inspection of Chart 4. These graphs were drawn in a way that
helps bring out the regular association between inventory move-
ments and business cycles. The years covered by expansion and
contraction are not the same in all graphs because the same busi-
nc3s chronology is not appropriate to all timing categories. The eye,
therefore, can get a rough impression of the regularity with which
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A striking feature is the difference in theresponse of inventories
to the milder and more violent episodes of the period.The'922I deflation, the great depression afteri 929, and the marked
recov. cry beginning in i are all reflected in large inventory
move.
ments. On the other hand, mild business cyclesin themiddle
'twenties are matched by equally mildchanges in inventories
Consonant with this is the fact thatmost of the defectionsfront
conformity come in this short periodof relative calm,1923-29. The
series that represent the ten industrygroups extend, in theaggre.. gate, overbusiness cycles, measured bothfrom troughto trough
and from peak to peak. Ofthese 95 cycles theinventories series do not conformOfl 21 occasions. But iof the 21 defectjonjoc- curred during'923-29 which included only3o cycles.1' This con-
centration appears to be duechiefly to the impactof changes in prices on inventory values.Later in this chapter,when inventories
corrected for changes inprices are considered, it willbe found that the physical volumeof inventories behavedno less regularly
during the mild cyclesof the 'twenties thanduring therest of the interwar period.
2Inventories in ConstantPrices
Inventories in currentprices show the behaviorof stocksas busi.. nessmen see it on theiraccount books. Book valuesare relevant to business decisionsas far as they tell businessmenhow much of their assets are committed inthis form. Theyare useful also because they area first approximationto estimates of thephysical volume of manufacturers'stocks, whichare far more important fromthe viewpoint of busmcss cycleanalysis. For businessmenusually judge whether their stocksare deficient or redundanton the basis of the number of physicalunits they holdrelative to expectedsales, out- put, pricemovements etc., noton the basis of the valueof the goods. In thisection we studythe physicalvolume of manufac- turers' stocksmore directly.
" If allowanceis made in thelumber andwood products series fora 3- month lag, defectionsnumber only15, of whichzi occur between 1923 and 1929.TOTAL
INVENTORiES DURING BUSINESS CYCLES 91
MWTHODS OFESTIMATION
Wefl construct anindex of quantities of stocks from book values
provided they can becorrected for changes in prices. This is not
easy,and we cannot expect toobtain anything more than crude
approxmations* Neverthele,such corrections were carried
through forKuznets' estimates of inventories in his ten manufac-
turing groups.The estimates for the individual industry groups
were thenaggregated to yield an estimate of manufacturers' hold-
nip.We have at hand alsoTerborgh's figures corrected for
changes in prices.The procedures by which the influence of
changes inprices on Kuznets' estimates was eliminated arede-
scribed fully in AppendixA, Part 2. Here we indicate only the
major difficultieslihllculties that could not be wholly overcome.
Manufacturers usually value theirinventories at cost except
that they mark themdown at the end of the year when replace-
ment costs are lowerthan original costs. Of this more below.Valu-
ation at cost means that asubstantial portion of manufacturers'
stocksgoods in proceand finished goodsenter the inventory
accounts at unit valuesmade up of the purchase price of raw ma-
terials consumed plus allowancesfor labor costs per unit, for other
direct costs, and for overhead.This in turn means that the be-
havior of unit values of goods in processand of finished goods can-
not be representedaccurately by the movements ofcommercial
prices of purchased materials forwhich there are public records.
We can allow for labor costs in afew cases but in no industry were
we able to allow forchanges in overhead costs perunit.
As a consequence, the indexesof purchased material prices that
enter into the indexes used to correctinventory values for changes
in prices were inevitablyoverweighted. I estimate that laborand
overhead costs should have borne aweight of not less than i8 per-
cent. They may have constituted asmuch as 30 percent of the cost
of inventories though it is highly unlikelythat they were so large.
iSFOr 1918.25 the price indexes used inall groups were devised by Kuznets
and his staff and published in CommodityFlow and Capital Formation,
Past VU. The same is true of the indexesused in later years for metal and
nietal products; stone, clay and glass; andmiscellaneous manufacturing. For
the other seven groups, revised indexes forthe years after 1925 were pie-
pared by me with the assistance of Fred Lynnand David Rolbein.S
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A second element of crudity inheres in the factthat thecow.
modity price series in our indexes are faroutnumbered by the
commodities included in inventories. In addition,the price SCTj
represent goods at early stages of fabricationmore adequately than
they do goods at later stages.
These defects in the price indexes havean identifiable bias.
While different classes of prices tendto turn at about thesane
time, the prices of highly fabricated goodshave a somewhatsmaller
cyclical amplitude than the prices ofless highly fabricatedgoods,
which are given undue weight inour indexes. Similarly,connnod.
ity prices probably havea larger cyclical amplitude than labor
costs per unit, which are inadequatelyrepresented. In general,
therefore, because of the pricedeflators we use, theamplitude of
inventories in constant prices isprobably understatedto some deS.
gree.'T Moreover, the turningpoints of inventories inconstant
prices are probably shiftedsomewhat in a fashion discussedbelow.
Finally, we must rememberthat while mostmanufacturing com-
panies mark down inventoryvalues at the end ofthe year when
replacement costsare lower than original costs,not all do so. Since
I could not discovcrthe exact proportion ofdeviations from the
common practice I assumed that allmanufacturers follow the rule of 'cost or market,whichever is lower'. I donot believe, however,
that this particular difficultycan cast serious doubton my findings.
The maximum degreeof error that could beengendered was tested by comparingour figures with those basedon the assumption that only half themanufacturers in each industryfollow the cost or
market rule (see App. A,Part 2).
Since the estimates ofinventories inconstant prices must ob- ously be subjectto serious error I donot rely upon the detailed results for individualindustries, but merelyseek to determine what general characteristiesare strongly supportedby the bulk of the evidence for all industries.Even with thisrestriction, the data yield useful information.
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Terborqh'S Estimates, 1915 Prices
II
'25'27
CCIIITQcIIO(IS (,hod.d) and enponsions(unsSodSd) art morSed ofl
oui' retereocS CWO099.
We note first the closesimilarity betwccn the twoforms of Kuz-
nets' estimates. Both move inthe same directionand at nearly the
same rate in every yearof the period except two,1919-20 and
1920-21. The big dropin prices at the endof 1920 produces a
high corrected value forinventories at the end ofthat year when
we assume thatmarkdowns were universalbut a low value when
we assume that they werenonexistent. Since moststocks are prob-
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CONr0RM1T' AND TIMING
Chart 5 shows Kuznets' andTcrborgh'scstirnatcsof manufactur-
ers' total inventoncs in constantprices arranged so as to distin-
guish their behavior during business expansions andcontractions.
For purposes of companson,Kuznets' estimates appear in two
forms: one based on the assumptionthat all manufacturers value
inventories at the lower of cost or market, the other on the assump-
tion that all value inventories at cost.Once more a simple inspec-
tion of the chart yields someuseful preliminary findings about the




7move in substantially the sameway except in the twoyears noted, we feel justified in confining attentionto the former,though the truth must lie between them.
Perhaps the most striking featureof the graph isthe regularity with which the peak andtrough values of inventorieslag behind the monthly reference dates,Beginning with thereference peakin 1920, a peak in inventories followsevery peak in businessand a trough in inventoriesevery trough in business.This regulaijty broken only in the expansionof World War Iand in thesubse- quent short contraction. Asrepresented by Terborgh'sestimates, inventories shrankbetween the end of1915 and the end of1917 and expanded duringthe contraction of1918-19. Whetherthis be- havior is an accuratepicture of events duringthe war isdifficult to say.'5 After WorldWar I, inventorycycles regularlylag behind the correspondingcycles of business.The mild businesscydes of the middle and late'twenties are matchedby mild inventorycycles. The deep depressionin business betweenthe peaks ofigand 1937 is equally markedin manufacturers'stocks. As theystand, however, the estimatessuggest that manufacturerswere able to re- duce their holdingsbut little duringthe violentbusiness contrac- tion and pricedeflation ofi 920-2!.The recoveryfrom the de- pression of1921, in contrast, iswell reflected.The volume of manufacturers' stocksconforms positivelyto business cycleswith an even more pronouncedand regular lagthan that exhibitedby book values. Thisvisual impressioncan be checked andreduced to quantitativeterms by measuringthe tinting andconformity for total manufacturingand the tenindustrygroups. The timingmeasures in Table22 for inventoriesin constant prices, madeon the same planas those in Table20 for inventories in currentprices, stronglysupport our preliminaryobservations.
11Terborgh got hisestimates inconstant prices bycomputing separate price indexes for eachof the 19component industriesthat makeup his total. He assumes that allinventorieswere valued atcost, except at theend of 1920 when heassumes that theywere marked downif replacementcosts Welt lower thanoriginal costs.
'5This only asuggestion. Pricecorrection is especiallylikely to err in Such an excited period ofinflation anddeflation, andour year cod figures may well, in thiscase, misrepresentthe true heightof the peak ofstocks and the true depth of theirtrough.
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22
Manufacturers' Inventories, Constant Prices
Timing at Business Cycle Turns, 1918-1938







(I) (a) (3) (4)()
Total mapuiacturing' o 'o +8.6
Food, beverages & tobacco4 1 4 +5.5
Textiles & textile products 2 6 +6.o
Leather & leather products o 10 +9.9
Rubber & related products4o 5 (a) + 11.9+8.9
Lumber & wood products' o 7 + 16.4
Paper, printing & publishing4 o + 9.5
Chemicals & allied products4o (a)4 +4.0 + 1.2
Stone, clay & glass productso 8 -1- 13.6
Metals & metal products a 6 + 7.6
Miscellaneous o 8 +8.8
Sum of 10 groups
Av. of io groups weighted by
no. of turns + 10.4
'Sec Table ao, note a.
b See Table 20, note b.
'The average in col. 4 includes a turn of stocks at the end of 1934. From 1933
to 1934 stocks declined only i percent. Had we assumed that stocks turned
at the end of 1933, the average lag would be only 7.4 months.






Food, beverages & tobacco1932+42.5
Rubber & related products1931 +30.5
1936+45.5
Paper, printing & publishing1931 + 30.5
Chemicals & allied products1931 +30.5
'935 + 33.5
eThe average in col. 4 includes a turn of stocks at the end of 1934. The stand-
ing at the end of 1933 was virtually the same as at theend of 1934. Had we
assumed that stocks turned at the end of '933, the average lag would be 14.6
months.
Based on ten comparisons, all of which arc lags,manufacturers'
total holdings turned on the average 8.6 months laterthan busi-
ness. The ten industry groups also laggedconsistently. Of the 64
comparisons between reference dates and turns in theinventories
held by individual industry groups, inventories lagged in 59and
led at only5.
95There is evidence iteic of a strong tendency for invcntoijesto
lag behind business by a considerable number of months. It isnot
easy, however, to determine the length of the lag. Total manufac.
turing lagged 8.6 months. An average of all 64 comparisonsyielded
by the ten groups suggests a lag of 10.4 months.2° But thedtsper.
sion about these figures is great. The average lag for the tengroup
ranges from about 3 to over i6 months. In view of the deviatioru
to be expected of measurements on annual data frorn,thetrue av-
erage lag, it does not seem safe to say more than that theaverage
lag of the physical volume of stocks behind general businessis prob-
ably more than 6 and less than i 2 months.
This implies that the lag of stocks inconstant prices tends to be
longer than that of stocks in current prices. Therecord clearly sup-
ports this implication. First, in the measures for theten industry
groups, inventories in current prices led the referenceturns in
nearly 25 percent of the comparisons. Forinventories in constant
prices, the leads were onlysome 8 percent of the comparisons. The
average for all comparisons between reference dates andthe turns
of the ten industrygroups (including the few judged from marked
changes in trend) yieldeda 5.2 month lag for inventories incur-
rent prices and a9.3 month lag for inventories in constant prices.
In current prices, manufacturers'total holdings lagged 3.8 months
on the average; in constant prices, 8.6 months.
This characteristic differencebetween the timing of inventories
in book values and inconstant prices is easily explained interms
of the cyclical behavior ofprices. We have concludedthat manu-
facturers' inventories inconstant prices tend to turn 6-12 months
later than general business.If prices were actuallyconstant near
business peaks and troughsthe movements of stocks incurrent
prices would parallel themovements of stocks in constant prices
at cyclical turns. But if pricesbegin to decline before business
reaches a peak or if they lagless than stocks, therise of stocks in
current prices will be impeded,and they will tendto reach a peak
and decline before stocksin constant prices.Again, stocks in cur-
rent prices will tend to leadstocks inconstant prices at businc
troughs if prices beginto rise before businessreaches a trough or
20 average would be 9.months if we includedthe four turns indicated by the marked changes intrend.
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The actual behavior of prices is consistcnt with this explanation.
Of the ii turns of general business between April 1919 and May
i938, the period for which we have inventory data also, the Bu-
reau of LaborStatistics wholesale price index led the National Bu-
reau referencedates at 8. Only one of the three lags exceeded4
months. Raw materials, moreover, have more weight in determin-
ing inventory values than do wholesale prices in general. The BLS
index of prices of raw materials turned before general business on
of io occasions between i 919 and 1938.21
These observations help to bolster our conclusions about the
timing of the physical volume of inventories. It is not clear, how-
ever, that thedifference between the timing of inventories in cur-
rent and constant prices is as large as our figures seem to indicate.
Since the amplitude of fluctuations in thc indexes used to correct
inventory values for changes in prices is probably too large, the
timing of inventories in constant prices is affected. If our deflators
overstate the movements of the unit value of inventories immedi-
ately after the peak in business, the turning points of inventories in
constant prices will tend to be postponed, relative to those of inven-
tories in current prices. If, therefore, the data indicate that inven-
'tories in constant prices turn 6-12 months later than business activ-
ity, the true lag is probably closer to 6 than to 12 months.
Table 23, summarizing our measures of the regularity with
which manufacturers' stocks respond to business cycles, is drawn
up on the same plan as Table 21. In measuringconformity, the lag
of stocks behind business is allowed for. The lags indicated in Table
22 were used after rounding to the nearest3-month interval. Three
'1The BLS index, however, is made up exclusively of unfabricated goods
whereas the raw materials used by many nlanufacturers include partly
fabricated goods purchased from other manufacturers.
The cyclical timing of prices was different before World War I. Between
1857 and 1914, peaks in the index of wholesale prices lagged behind those
of business cycles onof 13 occasions. On the average, prices lagged 1.5
months. At troughs prices lagged at 8 ofi 3 turns; the average lag was 4.5
months. These measures are based on the Warren-Pearson index before i8go
and on the BLS index since that date.
This tendency for prices to lag behind business cycle peaks andtroughs
before5914suggests that the relation betweeninventories in constant prices
and in book values may not have been the same as that since5919.
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groups, food, paper, and chemicals,wcrc treated on aSyflcht)now basis because theiraverage timing measures restedon too fewcom- parisons to do otherwise.
TABLE 23
Manufacturers' Inventories,Constant Prices




ASUMKD'NO. OF INDPX OF CONEOIUITY To (Mo.) PHA3ESb Exp. tontr. CvrI, (') () (s) 4) () (6) Total manufacturing + 9 + 100 +
Food, beverages & tobacco 0 10 + 2020 Textiles & textileproducts + 6 + 6o + 33 +4) Leather & leatherproducts+9 11 +20 +67 +8o Rubber & relatedproducts+9 ix+ 0 +4o Lulflber&woodpmducts +12 x +6o +33 +6o Paper, printing &publishing o zo+ too6o + Chemicals & alliedproducts Ov 10 +20 -'-6o Stone, clay & glassproducts+ 12 z+ 0 +6o Metals & metal products +9 +100 0 +8o MicejIancous +9 io +6o +20 +33 Prom Table22, col.and. Results are rounded to the nearest 3-month interval.
bTable21, note b.
See Table 21, noteC.
The indexes forfull cyclesconfirm our impressionthat inven- tories conformpositively to businesscycles. Theexpansion and full cycle indexes fortotal manufacturingare +oo. Six of the ten groups have full cycleindexes of +40or better. The full cycle in- dexes of thegroups are, on the whole,lower than those forinven- tories incurrent prices, but Sinceannual data usuallyyield lower indexes thanmonthly seriesa fairly high degree ofregularity of behavior is indicated.
Theresponse of the volumeof inventoriesto business cycles took the form ofa variation in trendrather than ofactual cycles in level even more often thandid theresponse of inventoriesin current prices. The trendwas stronglyUpward, as is evidencedby the high expansion indexes. Thecontraction indexes,in contrast,are low, sometimes negative,indicatinga net tendency inat least some groups for inventoriesto Continue risingduring contractions. As shown by the fullcycle indexes,however therate of rise during contractions even inthesegroups wasgenery lower than incx-pansions. Allowingfor the long lag already indicated, inventories
conformed positively during full cycles.
çhart 6 shows the stocks held by the ten industry groups as well
asby all manufacturers.Again the light and dark areas differ fzom
frame to frameaccording to the timing category of each series. The
graphs will help the reader form his own impression of the sensitiv-
ity of inventories togeneral waves of prosperity and depression.
One prominent feature of inventories in current prices is not re-
peated when the values are corrected for changes in prices. In the
former case we found that a high proportion of all defections from
conformity to busincss cycles came in the short period of mild busi-
ness cycles between 1923and 1929. The volume of inventories, in
contrast, responds as regularly, though, of course, not as vigor-
omly,to mild as to severe fluctuations in business. The ten industry
group seriesreprescnting inventories in constant prices extend, in
the aggregate, over g6 business cycles measured both from trough
to trough and from peak to peak. Inventories did not conform in
27 cycles. Only 10 defections come between 1923 and 1929, when
the ten series together extended over 30 cycles.
Inventories Held by Other Industrial Divisions
Though this study is devoted to manufacturers' inventories, it is
interesting to compare their cyclical behavior with inventories held
in other major divisions of the economy. Estimates we consider
sufficiently reliable for this purpose are available in both current
and constant prices for four divisions: trade, transportation and
other public utilities, mining, and agriculture. They wcrc first com-
piled by Simon Kuznets;2' minor revisions and extensions were
carried through by me. The four groups together with manufac-
turing hold about 95 percent of total inventories (Table 3).
Charts 7 and 8, depicting the movements of the five series from
1918 through 1938 or 1939, are arranged so as to distinguish be-
havior during business expansions and contractions marked off
' Kuznets presented the estimates in their original form in Commodity Flow
sd Capital Formation, Part VII, for year ends 1918-33. Subsequently he
extended the estimates to later years and used results derived from them in
Commodity Flow and Capital Formation in the Recent Recovery and Dc-
clint, 5932-1938, NEER, Bulletin 74, June1938,and National Product
dxce :86g.
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physical volume, as shown by the series in constantprices, cor-
respond almost as well. Trade skips thecontraction of1920-21,
but its growth is markedly retarded.Thereafter, its peaks and
troughs are synchronous with those ofmanufacturers' stocks until
the peak of 1929, when the latterturndown a year later. Both
series reach troughs in 1932, remain lowuntil the end of '934,
103 TOTAL INVENTORiESDURING BUSINESS CYCLESthen swccp upwardto a peak at the end of1937. As inmanufac. turing thcn, the stocksheld by wholesalersand retailersconfor positively to businesscycles witha lag that is longerfor estimat of physical volumethan for those incurrent prices.
This similaritybetween the inventoriesof the twomajor indus.. trial divisions extendsto transportation andother publicutiitj5. In it, however, thelags characteristicof the twomajor divisions are even more pronounced.
When we turnto mining and agriculturethe resemblancedis- appeais. The peaks and troughsof the miningseries aremore easily matched with thoseof business cycleson an inverted basis,and the conformitymeasures indicate invertedassociation. Theseresults would standout more clearlyin the chartshad the bigprice de. dines of1920-29 and 1929-32not depressedmining invcntorics in current pricesand the greatdepressIon after1929 left its mark on even the volume ofstocks.
The positivepattern of farm stocksin currentprices is dueto the violent swingsin agriculturalprices betweenprosperity andde- pression. Theestimate inconstant prices isa less regular series whichappears to move inverselyif therc isany regular association at all with businesscycles.
Table 24, whichsummarizes thetiming comparisons,and Table 25, which presentsmeasures of conformity,give theseimpressions
TABLE 24
Inventories, FiveMajor IndustrialDivisions Timing atBusiness CycleTurm, tcl8-I938
INV E NT 0 RI F .5
Except foragriculture, inventoriesare corrected forchanges in priceon the
assumption thatthey are valuedat the lower ofcost or market.Estimates for
agriculturearc derIved frotHphysicalquantities multipitedb end ofyear
prices in1929.
Timing measuredlover tedlv;see Ch.3, note 5. One lag omittedbecause itexceeded 24months.
CIJ1RNT PPIC1S
1\FLNIORIFS, 1929flIeRs' NI'MRER OFOR tAr. (4 ).
I4IUR (IFOR tA ().
leadsLags MO. I r.idI.ag MO.
(I) 2t() (4) (V,))t) 7) Manufacturing 2 8+.8 oto -1-8.6
Trade
2 8+.8 0 8 +5.9 Transp.&otherpub.ut.i 10 +9.7 oio+12.1'
Agriculture 6 i5.2 3 21.9 Mining&quarryingb4 4o.g 4 4 0.2
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TABLE 25
Inventories, Five Major Industrial Divisions
Conformity to Business Cycles, 1918.1938
'From Table 24, col. 4 and 7. Results arc rounded to nearest 3-month interval.
bSee Table 21, note b. Sec Tible 21, noteC.
objective form. The lags of inventories in manufacturing, trade,
and public utilities are more consistent and longer for estimates in
constant than in current prices. The transportation and public
utilities series is the most serious laggard of the three, but it is
doubtful that the apparent difference 'between trade and manu-
facturing (in 1929 prices) is significant. It arises partly because
in these annual data trade skips the i 920-21 contraction and partly
because its trough at the end of the great depression is placed at
the end of 1933 instead of at the end of 1934 as is done for manu-
facturing. For both series the change between the two year ends is
very small.
The mining and agriculture series also hear out the impression
gained from the charts. The cycles in the former correspond easily
to business cycles on an inverted basis and indicate anapproxi-
mately synchronous association. The latter appear to lead when
estimates in current prices are matched positively with business
cycles. But the comparisons are fewer than for the other divisions





AUMED'NO. OFINDLE OP CON0RM1TY TOBUSINE3
(Mo.) PHASES LIp.Contr.Cycle
() (2)() ()() (6)
INVENTORIEs, CURRENT PRICES
Manufacturing +3 10 + zoo+ 100 + 100
Trade +3 10 +100+100 +100
Transp. & other pub. Ut.+9 II + 100+ zoo + zoo
Agriculture 6 10 +20+6o+78
Mining and quarrying o zo6o 6o 56
INVENTORIES, 1929 PRICES
Manufacturing +9 Ii + 100+ 33 + 100
Tradc +6 II +100+33 +100
Transp. & other pub. Ut.+ 12 II + 100+ 67+ 8o
Agriculture 0' iø20 6o 78
Mining & quarrying 0 106o--6o78S
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Trade and transportation,like manufacturing,conformregu- lady and positivelyto business cycles, allowingfor theindicated lag of stocks. Miningconforms inversely with fairregularity.Stocks on farms conform positively underthe influence ofchanges in prices but inversely withfair regularity whenthe effect ofchang.. ing prices has beeneliminated.
Both the similaritiesand differences ininventory cyclestlese tables revealare illuminating. For example,as we shallsee later, the relation betweenbusiness cycles andmanufacturers'stocks is a composite of divers behaviortraits characteristicof variouscate- gories of manufacturers'stocks. In particularwe shall find that inverted behavior,or long lags vergingon invertedmovement, is characteristic of stocksof certain classesof staplefinished goods. For such commodities,manufacturerscan safely riska certain de. lay in adjustingthe pace of theiroperations fullyand promptlyto cycles in theirsales. Invertedbehavior is characteristicalso of situ- ations in whichmanufacturerscannot easily controlthe size oftheir stocks of purchasedmaterials, eitherbecause theymust buy them long in advanceor because theconditions underwhich theraw materialsare supplied forcethe rate offabrication toadjust itself to the rate of supplyrather thanto the rate ofdemand. In thelight of these findingsit is significantthat the stocksof both farmersand mine operatorsconsist mainlyof staplegoods thatare 'finished' from thestandpoint of theeindustries; farmers,of course,cannot quickly adjusttheir outputto demand. Thesefacts raise theinter- esting possibilitythat theapparently differentbehavior of stocks in the variousindustrial divisionsmay be foundto be rather readily susceptible torationalization interms of a singleconsistent hy- pothesis. But thisis a suggestionfor futureinvestigation ratherthan a problem for thisstudy.
Whether ornot this possibilityof reconcilingdifferences in the action of thevarious divisionsof theeconomy turnsout to be a valid lead,25we should stillnotice theimpressive degreeto which 25 Even ifit shouldprove possibleto organizesupport for this theory,it seems likely thatthe degree of(inverted)association betweenbusiness cycles
and stockson farms willturn out to beweak. Forthe output ofcrops and livestock, thoughsubject topronounced cycles,is eitherunrelated or only tenuously relatedto business cycles.Geoffrey H.Moore willtreat this question
in his forthcomingstudy of HarvestCycles.toTAL INVENTORIESDURiNG BUSINESS CYCLES 107
the formulaearlier established for manufacturers' stocks is re-
peated in trade andtransportation. The positive and lagged con-
formity of these threedivisions, which together account for about
o percentof all commodity stocks, serves to enhance the import-
ance of thenext section and of other portions of thisstudy which
appraise our findings aboutmanufacturers' stocks.
4Significance o/the Findings
We have concludedfrom the interwar record that manufacturers'
aggregate stocks varypositively with business cycles, lagging more
than 6 but less than I 2months. It is well to realize exactly what
such long lags mean. Tomake our ideas quite definite, assume that
the true average lag is 9months.24 During the 21 business cycles
since 1854 the NationalBureau has identified, expansions lasted
on the averageslightly more than 26 months, contractionsonly
21.5 months. A9-month lag, therefore, means that aggregate
physical inventories of manufacturerswould decline for slightly
more thanone-third of an average expansion andwould continue
to increase for over 40percent of an averagecontraction. More-
over,of the 21 expansions and 13 ofthe 2! contractions lasted
iB months or less. In suchshort phases manufacturers'inventories
would move counter to business forhalf the phase or more. This
assumes, of course, thatthe lag of inventories behindgeneral busi-
ness is not correlatedwith the length of cyclical phases.
If these observations are valid, they serveboth to correct and to
give precision to the suggestions putforward by earlier writers.
The juxtaposition of my findingsabout the timing of stockswith
the Bureau's measures ofexpansions and contractionsmakes it
easier to see Blodgett's results infair perspective. Heconcluded
that manufacturers' inventories moveinversely to business. In the
light of my findings, this appears tobe true only of the shorter
movements (18 months orless) which have constituted amajor-
ity of business contractions inthe United States but only asmall
minority of expansions. As alreadystated, however, Blodgcttdis
cerned a tendency for seriesthat normally behaveinversely to
move with business in"long and severe"contractions. Blodgett's
24is figure,
above.
however, may exaggerate the truelag somewhat; see Section 2:
i o8
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findings and ourown, therefore, arc more nearly
consistent than may appear at first glance.
The results of thischapter arc less easilyreconciled withthe views of other writers.My observationsare at odds withat least one reading of Hawtrey'stheorythat cycles ofstocks offinished goods offset those ofstocks of goods inprocess. Some suchoffset- ting theremay be during somestages of the businesscycle. The offsetting action of thetwo groups of stocks,as far as it exists,how- ever, is either not continuousor incomplete. A definitecycle of in- ventories relatedto business cycles doesmanifest itself.Ofcourse, Hawtrey's theory ofthe trade cycle,as already stated,depends upon a virtual cycle in thedemandfor stocks,not upon an actual cycle of inventoriesphysically acquired.The broad linesof hisex- planation of bnsinesscycles are, therefore,untouched bymy ob- servations. On theothcr hand, theinvisible cycle inthe demandfor stocks, which Hawtrcystresses, is closely relatedto the visible fluc- tuations in theamount of goods held.If businessmendesire to hold larger inventoriesin the earlymonths ofexpansion, theirorders and their plannedoutput may be affectedby the factthat their stocks are shrinkingin those monthsinstead ofexpanding. Both Mitchelland Keynessuggest thataggregate inventories generallymove with business,but neitherappeared toexpect such a long lag as I find.2'True, Keynesasserts that liquidstocks in- crease for some timeafter the peakof businessand declineafter its trough, buthe contendsthat theiraction will beoutweighed by the movementsof workingcapital, whicharc (roughly) synchro- nous with business. IfKeynes is rightabout thebehavior patterns of workingand liquidcapital, however,the fluctuationsof the latter must, infact, be largeenough todominate the totalduring the earlypart of businessexpansions andcontractions.Otherwise. we would not findthe lag thatappeals.
Keynes' hypothesisabout theinteraction offluctuations in work- ing and inliquid capitalled himto put forwarda theory about the behavior ofinventoryinvestment. Hesuggested thatthe rate of investment is lowbut positivein the earlymonths ofexpansion when the increaseof workingcapital is beingoffset bya decline in The same istrue of Hawtu-vas far as he
to find an actual cycle in stocks.1iyrAL INVENTORiESDURING BUSINESS CYCLES 109
liquid capital andthat it rises as liquid capital ceases to fall and
begins to increase.Similarly, he suggests that after the peak of busi.
,stocks will be dechnmg but that the rate will be low as long
as liquidand working capital are moving in opposite directions.
When liquid capital toobegins to be reduced, the rate of disinvest-
ment accelerates.The typical cycle pattern of inventories, however,
is somewhatdifferent. Total stocks do not merely grow slowly in
the early months ofexpansion; they actually decline. They do not
merely decline slowly after the peak ofbusiness; they actually in-
crease for somemonths. This suggests that the pattern of inven-
tory investmentduring business cycles is unlikely to accord well
with the model implicit in Keynes' views.
The above observations indicate also thatthe principle of ac-
celeration as applied to inventoriesrequires modification. This
theory of inventory investment, in itssimple form, holds that in-
ventories vary directly and proportionately with output.Assum-
ing, for the time being, that outputand business at large move to-
gether, the observation that inventories lag manymonths behind
business requires explanation. J. M. Clark,who first advanced the
hypothesis, never supposed that what I havedescribed as the
theory "in its simple form" was an adequatedescription of reality.
He stressed, from the beginning, thatbusiness decisions about in-
vestment are likely to lag behindthe changes in output or sales
that call for them, and that still more timeis required to execute
investment decisions once they are made.Both qualifications are
consistent with the observed lag of inventoriesbehind output, and
I shall argue that both are involved in acomplete account of in-
ventory behavior. But other factorswill also be found to be import-
ant. Moreover, the principle mayhave direct and simple appli-
cation to some parts of total inventories.
Having found so much awry in thetheories of inventory be-
havior even with respect to aggregate stocks,it is pleasant to end
this chapter with a glance at Metzlcr'ssuggestion. His model of an
inventory cycle involves the sound notion thatinventories lag be-
hind business. Whether he would expect aslong as lag as I have
found cannot be said, but in a broad wayhis theory of the dy-
namics of inventory cycles is consistentwith the lag of inventories
at cyclical turns.